And there are some who disagree, but can`t do anything. Another question is whether true peer disagreements are the only peer dissensions of epistemic importance. Suppose you have created an argument that you find well-founded in the solitude of your office. If you think about what your (peer) would think, you assume that you reasonably come to the conclusion that she would disagree on the benefits of your argument. If such a conclusion is reasonable for you, it would seem that this fact should have epistemic consequences for you, although there is no (at least still) real disagreement. Such disagreement may even have the same epistemetic meaning as an actual disagreement (see Carey & Matheson 2013). In the same way, if an evil tyrant believes (P) and chooses to eliminate all peers who disagree who do not believe, he would not be justified in his previously controversial faith (Kelly 2005). One of the challenges is to identify the episemic disagreements that are only possible, given that there is clearly not all a risk of global skepticism (Barnett and Li 2017). Issues related to counterfactual disagreements will also be discussed at Ballantyne 2013b, Bogardus 2016 and Morgensen 2016. Disagreement and skepticism are also conditional. The nature and extent of differences of opinion are both matters of eventuality, so since skepticism about differences of opinion is due to these factors, the sceptic consequences of differences are also due. At another time, the shape of the Earth was quite controversial. While there is no universal consensus that the Earth is roughly spherical, the conditions for recognition of controversies in this matter are no longer met.
Similarly, at some point, the issues of current great controversies will not be able to meet the conditions for recognition of controversies. The skeptical threat of disagreement can therefore come and go. In other words, the endurance record of various philosophical disagreements strongly indicates that they will not go anywhere in the near future. Here are the questions of agreement/disagreement plus levels of conviction: to some extent, it may seem that there are only three doxastic attitudes to adopt with regard to the truth of a statement: believe that it is true, believe that it is false (i.e. incredulous) and interrupt judgment about it. In the simplest sense of the word, two individuals disagree with a proposition when they adopt different doxastic attitudes towards the same proposition (one of them believes it and the other does not, or one believes it and suspends judgment). But of course, there is also a level of confidence that one can have in relation to a proposal. We may agree that global warming is taking place, but you may be much more confident than I am.
It may be useful to use “disagreement” to cover differences in trust levels: if (X ) has a level of trust regarding the truth of faith (B ) while (Y ) has another level of trust, then “disagree” about (B) – even if it is a slightly artificial feeling of “disagreement”. These levels of trust or belief are often presented as points on a scale of 0 to 1 (including), with larger values displaying a higher degree of confidence in the truth of the statement. Even if they are a little artificial, these representations make it possible to discuss cases more precisely. No one has the right to express their disagreement with the company in this way. The equal weight is also motivated by a reflection on testimonials. The weight of a testimony is proportional to the witness` epistemic position (or what the listener`s evidence on the witness` epistemic position supports). So, if you have reason to think that Jais is below the epistemic position relative to May(P), then the discovery that Jai thinks (P) will be a weaker reason to believe (P ) than to discover that Mai believes (P ). .